Orbital Surveillance and Strategic Defense
Overviews of strategic orbital surveillance systems and minimum strategic nuclear defense requirements
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My paper on arms verification and the physics of reconnaissance satellites
When I was in college I wrote a term paper on the physics and mathematics of global orbital surveillance systems, downloadable here as a PDF: Arms Verification and the Physics of Reconnaissance Satellites. It was fairly exhaustive. Looking back on it all these years later, it’s still a good introductory primer.
This paper presents the basics of orbital surveillance and reconnaissance, both optically and at radio frequencies. The basics of of orbital radar (for ground surveillance) are described, along with infrared early warning satellite technology. The physics of low-earth orbits for maintaining constant-angle shadows from one day to the next are analyzed (the critical orbital inclination being 97 degrees to the Earth’s equator). The physics of the nuclear double flash are described in a technical appendix, the significance being that the yield of an atomic bomb is proportional to the intervals between various parts of the double flash and can thus be measured remotely and non-cooperatively. The difficulty of evading overhead surveillance is discussed.
Update on the Vela Event of 1979
In my satellite paper I left open the question of what a Vela satellite saw with its double-flash-sensing bhangmeters on 22 September 1979 over the Indian Ocean. I believe that it has subsequently become clear from unclassified sources that the Vela satellite bhangmeters did observe a low-yield (about 3-kT) bomb blast, likely an Israeli-built neutron bomb that could be used in either an artillery shell or a missile warhead. The test was apparently conducted near Prince Edward Island, either from a disguised commercial ship or a barge, and possibly including deployment of the weapon from a balloon to further mask its signatures from seismic and hydroacoustic sensors. The test sponsors, probably a combined Israeli-South African group, did their best to hide it, but were foiled by a momentary break in cloud cover when they fired the shot. Take that, you guys! They also may have mistakenly thought that the Vela satellites’ bhangmeters were not functional when they conducted their test, when in fact it was the Vela’s on-board electromagnetic pulse (EMP) detector that was not operational.
My papers on minimum strategic deterrence requirements and a simple atomic bomb design
I wrote two companion papers at about the same time. I won’t post one of them, which described my own, particular design of a low-budget but effective gun-type fission weapon powered by U-235.
I have posted the other one, on the minimum requirements of strategic defense for the United States during the Cold War: Strategic Deterrence Requirements. This document was basically a rational computation of the minimum number of nuclear warheads that the U.S. would have needed to maintain a totally survivable and credible deterrent force during those years. Now that the Cold War is over, the current minimum strategic defense requirements for the U.S. are even smaller.
Nuclear double flash curve. Bomb yield can be estimated from the hump-to-hump interval.
Nuclear double flash time lapse images from U.S. government public-domain film footage of a hydrogen bomb explosion
